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A Binding and Perpetual Obligation: Protecting 
Louisiana’s Sixteenth Section Land as a Natural 
Resource 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Jefferson believed that if the United States was to 
remain a free nation, it needed to become an educated nation.1 In a 
1787 letter to James Madison, Jefferson remarked, “Above all things 
I hope the education of the common people will be attended to; 
convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the most 
security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.”2 Jefferson 
also believed that government could help promote education in the 
general populace by reserving land in newly formed towns for the 
building of local schools.3  
As the young United States gained more territory, and new states 
entered the Union, Congress put Jefferson’s ideas into practice. In 
exchange for statehood, Congress formed agreements4 with new 
state governments in which discrete portions of land, “Sixteenth 
Section”5 land, were permanently set aside for public schools.6 
These compacts imposed a “binding and perpetual obligation” on 
the states to use that land for the benefit of public education.7 
Thomas Jefferson’s musings became the United States’ first national 
education policy. 
Sixteenth Section lands have recently been the source of legal 
controversy between Louisiana school boards and the Louisiana oil 
and gas industry.8 This conflict is aggravated by the lack of clarity in 
both the statutory scheme and jurisprudence governing Sixteenth 
Section land. Article XII, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution 
grants the state immunity from prescription in all civil matters 
unless dictated otherwise by statute.9 Decisions by Louisiana Courts 
of Appeal have split over whether the state’s constitutional 
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 1. See ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
179 (1970).  
 2. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 
(Dec. 20, 1787), in WRITINGS 918 (1984). 
 3. See HEALEY, supra note 1, at 179. 
 4. See Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 523 (1980).  
 5. See Part II.A. (defining Sixteenth Section land). See generally C. Maison 
Heidelberg, Note, Closing the Book on the School Trust Lands, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
1581, 1584–91 (1992). 
 6. See infra Part II and note 19. 
 7. Andrus, 446 U.S. at 523. 
 8. See infra Part III.D. 
 9. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13. 
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immunity from prescription should apply to actions involving 
Sixteenth Section lands when that land is engaged in commerce with 
the oil industry.10 
If Sixteenth Section lands benefit from the state’s prescription 
immunity, those companies that contract with school boards for 
mineral exploration on Sixteenth Section land could potentially face 
permanent exposure to imprescriptible causes of action. On the other 
hand, if prescription is allowed to run, elected school board officials 
must provide legal protection for Sixteenth Section lands, a task for 
which the state is far better suited. Ultimately, Congress intended 
that Sixteenth Sections should be held by the state solely for the 
purpose of furthering public education. Elected school boards 
should not be burdened with the legal responsibility of managing 
legal claims involving Sixteenth Sections within standard 
prescriptive time periods. Therefore, the state’s immunity from 
prescription should be extended to actions involving Sixteenth 
Section land. 
The jurisprudential split on this issue does not stem from a value 
judgment about these lands, but from a failure to properly categorize 
Sixteenth Section land within Louisiana law. This Comment 
attempts to provide the appropriate categorization for Sixteenth 
Section land by examining the governing statutes and relevant 
jurisprudence while focusing on policy considerations and civil law 
concepts. This Comment then provides two judicial solutions to the 
issue that the Louisiana Supreme Court may implement in lieu of 
sweeping revision to the statutes governing Sixteenth Section land. 
Part II examines the history of Sixteenth Section lands and how they 
evolved into their present state. Part II also discusses the split among 
the circuits over prescription on actions involving Sixteenth Section 
land. Part III attempts to properly classify Sixteenth Section land in 
civil law terms and suggests two legal solutions provided in the 
existing framework of trust law and the public trust doctrine. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of Sixteenth Section Lands 
At the conclusion of the American Revolution, Great Britain 
ceded the vast Northwest Territory to the United States, leaving the 
new federal government in control of over 200,000 square miles of 
land.11 In order to efficiently transfer this land to private ownership 
and better prepare it for statehood, the Continental Congress 
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra Part III.D. 
 11. Heidelberg, supra note 5, at 1585. 
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passed the Land Ordinance of 1785, which, among other things, 
created the rectangular survey system for public land.12 Under this 
system, all federal land was divided into six-mile square 
townships.13 These townships were further subdivided into thirty-
six, one-mile square Sections.14 The Sixteenth Section of each 
township was deemed to be reserved “for the maintenance of 
public schools.”15 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which 
provided for the governance of the Northwest Territory, expressly 
stated the underlying policy of the reservation by declaring that 
“religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means 
of education shall forever be encouraged.”16 
These ordinances established a series of “honorary,” if not 
legal, trust relationships between the federal government and the 
states.17 Upon completion of the surveys, ownership of each 
township and section was taken out of the federal government’s 
control and vested in the new states.18 Congress subsequently 
extended this reservation to all land acquired through the Louisiana 
Purchase.19 As a result, when Louisiana was admitted into the 
Union as a separate state in 1812, ownership of the reserved 
Sixteenth Section land in each township passed to Louisiana’s state 
government. In 1843, an Act of Congress granted states the right to 
sell any land reserved for school use, so long as the proceeds from 
any such sales were placed in “some productive fund” directed by 
the state legislatures for the use and support of public schools.20  
                                                                                                             
 12. See Papasan v. United States, 756 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing 
public land survey practices in Mississippi), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); see also Vernon Carstensen, Patterns on 
the American Land, PUBLIUS, Autumn 1988, at 31, 31–39 (1988) (offering a 
concise description of the public land survey system). 
 13. Land Ordinance of May 20, 1785, in 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 375–406 (J.C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933); see also Papasan 
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 (citing 1 LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 565 (1815)). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 1 USC at LVII (2012). 
 17. See Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 173–74 (1914) (“The gift to the 
state is absolute, although, no doubt, as said in Cooper v. Roberts, ‘there is a sacred 
obligation imposed on its public faith.’ But that obligation is honorary . . . .”). 
 18. See Act of Apr. 21, 1806, ch. 39, § 11, 2 Stat. 391, 394 (1806); Act of 
March 3, 1811, ch. 46 § 10, 2 Stat. 662, 665 (1811); see also Papasan v. United 
States, 756 F. 2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1985), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
 19. Act of Apr. 21, 1806, ch. 39, § 11, 2 Stat. 391, 394 (1806); see also JOHN 
L. MADDEN, FEDERAL AND STATE LANDS IN LOUISIANA 232 (1973). 
 20. Louisiana v. William T. Joyce Co., 261 F. 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1919) (At 
least one scholar has suggested that this statute was unnecessary considering the 
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Decisions in both federal and Louisiana courts during the next 
half-century confirmed that Congress donated their title to the land 
in the form of a grant to each state, with the express condition of 
reserving Sixteenth Sections for school use.21 While never 
expressly using the term, the text of the federal grants often 
describe the state as a trustee of the land on behalf of the people of 
the state for the purposes of public education.22 Despite the school 
boards’ administrative authority over Sixteenth Section land, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that school boards were not, 
and had never been, owners of the land.23 Other Louisiana courts 
have also maintained that, while the state owns Sixteenth Section 
lands, they are unique and separate from all other forms of public 
land and are placed under the administrative control of parish 
school boards.24  
                                                                                                             
 
State of Louisiana already possessed the right to sell these lands through its fee 
simple ownership.). See Ryan M. Seidemann, Curious Corners of Louisiana 
Mineral Law: Cemeteries, School Lands, Erosion, Accretion, and Other Oddities, 
23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 93, 106 (2009). 
 21. See Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. 173, 181–82 (1855) (“The trusts created 
by these compacts relate to a subject certainly of universal interest, but of 
municipal concern, over which the power of the State is plenary and exclusive. In 
the present instance, the grant is to the State directly, without limitation of its 
power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public faith.”); Garland 
v. Jackson, 7 La. Ann. 68, 68 (1852) (“The sixteenth section of every township of 
the public lands of the United States, have, from the adoption of the Constitution, 
been reserved from public sales, for the maintenance of public schools in the 
township; and this reservation has always been considered a grant to the State in 
which it lies, on the admission of the State into the Union.”). 
 22. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Ober, 32 La. Ann. 417, 419 (1880) (“These lands 
were donated by Congress to this State for public school purposes. By Act of Feb. 
15, 1843, the legislature was authorized by Congress to provide for their sale and 
the conveyance of a fee simple title to the purchaser, and the manner of sale and 
disposition of proceeds was prescribed by our legislative Acts of 1855. The State 
is a trustee of the lands, or of the proceeds of their sale, for the use of the 
inhabitants of the townships wherein they are located.”). For a discussion of this 
development in states other than Louisiana, see Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 
(Wyo. 2003); Sally K. Fairfax et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at 
Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 810 (1992). 
 23. See Ober, 32 La. Ann. at 419 (“The title to this land has never been in the 
parish Board of School Directors. The title was in the State under the donation of 
the general government, and she held it for a specific purpose, with authority to 
sell the lands, and a mandate to hold the proceeds and invest them for the benefit 
of the schools.”). 
 24. See State v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 197 So. 140, 144 (La. 1940) (“For 
more than one hundred years it has been the settled policy of this State, as 
reflected in various constitutional and statutory provisions, to treat sixteenth 
section lands as separate and distinct from all other State lands and to place them 
under the control of the school authorities.”). 
2014] COMMENT 365 
 
 
 
Since Louisiana joined the Union, its legislature has statutorily 
delegated the power to maintain and dispose of the reserved 
Sections to the school boards of each parish in which they are 
located.25 Three sections of Louisiana’s Revised Statutes govern 
Sixteenth Section land, also referred to as “school lands.”26 Under 
current statutes, individual parish school boards have the right to 
administer and use Sixteenth Section land for public school 
purposes.27 School boards may rent the land or even sell excess 
land within a Sixteenth Section with voter approval, so long as the 
revenue from any such sale is used for public school purposes.28 
School boards are also empowered to grant mineral leases on 
Sixteenth Section land, subject to approval by the State Mineral 
Board.29 However, the statutes do not discuss the school boards’ 
relationship to the state in regards to the state’s constitutional 
immunity from prescription. The failure of the statutes to directly 
address the nature of this ambiguous relationship has led to a 
divided jurisprudence on the issue.  
B. Liberative Prescription in Louisiana Law 
Prescription is a mode of acquiring or discharging rights 
through the passage of time.30 There are three types of 
prescription: acquisitive, liberative, and nonuse.31 Acquisitive 
prescription solidifies ownership in a possessor after a set amount 
of time.32 Prescription of nonuse, on the other hand, extinguishes 
the right of a possessor if that possessor fails to exercise his or her 
right during a set amount of time.33 Liberative prescription, of 
which this Comment is chiefly concerned, is a mode of 
                                                                                                             
 25. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013); see also Humble Oil, 197 So. 
140. 
 26. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:631–41:981 (2006 & Supp. 2014) 
(governing the rules associated with public lands and chapter six of that title 
contains the rules relating to sixteenth section “school lands”); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 30:151–30:159 (2007 & Supp. 2014) (governing leases by State political 
subdivisions in which school lands are included); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:87–
17:87.9 (2013) (governing the administration of sixteenth section land by school 
boards). 
 27. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:638 (2006). 
 28. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:639 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 41:714 
(2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 41:841 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 41:981(E) 
(2006). 
 29. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:152, 30:158. 
 30. Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, Prescription, in YIANNOPOULOS’ CIVIL 
LAW PROPERTY COURSEBOOK 294 (9th ed. 2009). 
 31. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3445 (2014). 
 32. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3446 (2014). 
 33. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3448 (2014). 
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extinguishing certain legal claims after the passage of a certain 
amount of time.34 Liberative prescription functions as the civil law 
equivalent of common law statutes of limitation.35 Prescription is 
fundamental in civil law jurisdictions.36 Cicero described 
prescription as that which “ends the fear of the dangers of 
litigation.”37 Indeed, civilian scholars have often noted that the 
primary social utility of prescription is stability achieved by 
assuaging such fears in the general public.38 After a set time, 
owners no longer must prove the validity of their title, and 
individuals no longer need to protect their patrimony from legal 
claims. 
While the policy behind prescription is rational, the time 
periods imposed are varied and often appear arbitrary.39 In 
Louisiana law, the Civil Code of 1825 established prescriptive 
periods of ten years for contract claims, three years for delinquent 
pay, and one year for tort claims.40 However, the Civil Code of 
1825 maintained numerous exceptions to these three varieties, each 
themselves of a different length of time.41 Title XXIV of the 
current Louisiana Civil Code was last revised in 198342 and 
contains the articles governing prescription.43 Prescriptive periods 
                                                                                                             
 34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2014).  
 35. See FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT 
LAW § 10.02 (2d ed. 2004).  
 36. Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, supra note 30, at 294. See also DIAN 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT ET AL., YIANNOPOULOS’ CIVIL LAW PROPERTY COURSEBOOK 
295–330 (9th ed. 2009). 
 37. “[F]inis solici tudinis ac periculi litium.” M. TULLII CICERONIS, 
ORATIONES, VOLUME II 288 (George Long & A.J. Macleane eds., 1855).  
 38. Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & Albert-Anatole Tissier, Prescription, in 5 
CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 16 (La. State Law Inst. Trans., 1972). 
 39. See generally Benjamin West Janke, The Failure of Louisiana’s 
Bifurcated Liberative Prescription Regime, 54 LOY. L. REV. 620 (2008). In 
Louisiana’s original Digest of 1808, largely based on the French Civil Code, a 
general prescriptive period of 30 years was imposed for all actions with a 
multitude of exceptions. For example, “architects or undertakers were granted 
either a ten- or five-year prescriptive period depending on the type of building 
material used.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 73 (1808). The Civil Code of 1825 eliminated 
the general time period and imposed a prescriptive period of ten years for contract 
claims, three years for delinquent pay, and one year for tort claims while retaining 
numerous exceptions of varying lengths of time. 
 40. See Benjamin West Janke, The Failure of Louisiana’s Bifurcated 
Liberative Prescription Regime, 54 LOY. L. REV. 620, 641 (2008). 
 41. Id.  
 42. See Act No. 173, 1983 La. Acts 429 (revising Title XXIV articles on 
prescription).  
 43. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3445–3505 (2014). 
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range from thirty, ten, five, two, and one year(s).44 Regarding 
Sixteenth Sections, Louisiana prescription law makes it necessary 
for school board members, who are often not attorneys, to be 
cognizant of this varied structure when contracting mineral leases. 
Though the time period of prescription varies widely with the 
type of property and the cause of action, all actions involving 
private persons and private things are susceptible of prescription 
unless prohibited by statute.45 Prescription does not, however, run 
against public things.46 Additionally, Article XII of the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1974 specifically prohibits the running of 
prescription against the state.47 The effects of these provisions for 
disputes over Sixteenth Section land are easily recognizable. If the 
state is considered the owner, prescription cannot run against any 
potential action brought by a school board for any issue regarding 
Sixteenth Section land. 
C. Prescription and Sixteenth Section Land: Differing 
Interpretations 
During the twentieth century, a jurisprudential divide emerged 
over whether school boards enjoyed the immunity from 
prescription provided to the state by the Louisiana Constitution. 
One line of jurisprudence, beginning early in the twentieth century, 
held that actions involving these lands benefited from the state’s 
prescription immunity even though school boards were statutorily 
empowered to administer Sixteenth Section land in a fairly 
autonomous way. In 1912, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided 
State v. F.B. Williams Cypress Co.48 In that case, the Assumption 
Parish School Board sued for damages resulting from unlawful 
                                                                                                             
 44. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3486 (establishing acquisitive 
prescription of thirty years for immovables); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3491 
(establishing acquisitive prescription of ten years for movables); LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 3497 (establishing liberative prescription of five years for the included 
actions); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3494 (establishing liberative prescription of 
three years for the included actions); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3493.10 establishing 
liberative prescription of two years for delictual actions as a result of an act of 
violence); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (establishing liberative prescription of 
one year for all other delictual actions). 
 45. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3467; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3485. 
 46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 405 (2014) (noting that the imprescriptibility of 
such things is a consequence of their insusceptibility of private ownership). 
 47. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13 (reasoning expression unius exclusion 
alterius). 
 48. State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 58 So. 1033 (La. 1912), amended by 
61 So. 988 (La. 1913). 
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conversion of timber on Sixteenth Section land.49 The defendant 
timber company claimed the one-year prescriptive period for 
conversion had expired.50 The timber company additionally argued 
that the state’s immunity from prescription only applied in 
situations where the state sued on her own behalf and not when it 
was merely represented as a trustee by a particular school board.51 
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this argument.52 The court 
held that, although the school boards aided the state in directing the 
land towards an educational purpose, the state remained the owner, 
and therefore prescription could run against the state in a Sixteenth 
Section action.53  
In 1915, in State v. New Orleans Land Co., the board of 
directors of public schools in Orleans Parish sued to reclaim 
Sixteenth Section land previously purchased by the defendant.54 
The defendant land company claimed that its ancestors in title had 
predated Louisiana’s admission to the Union and acquired 
ownership through acquisitive prescription after the passage of the 
requisite thirty years.55 The Louisiana Supreme Court held in favor 
of the school board and stated that prescription could not run 
against the state on its own property, which included Sixteenth 
Section land.56  
During the 1920s, the Louisiana Supreme Court shifted 
perspective and held that school boards were state agencies, which 
are not entitled to the immunity from prescription granted to the 
state. The Louisiana Supreme Court first propounded this 
reasoning in regards to state levee boards. In Board of 
Commissioners v. Pure Oil Co., the levee district sued for unpaid 
royalties due under a mineral lease.57 The defendants pled three-
year liberative prescription.58 The levee board argued that it was a 
state agency created by the state for the sole purpose of carrying 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 1034.  
 50. Id. at 1036. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1037 (“The proposition that the rule of prescription established by 
the Constitution does not apply to the state in her capacity as trustee is untenable. 
Everything that the state holds in her capacity as sovereign she holds as trustee.”).  
 54. State v. New Orleans Land Co., 79 So. 515, 516 (La. 1918). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id at 519. (“Prescription acquirendi causa does not run against the state for 
her own property. Still less could it be allowed to run against the state for school 
land.”). 
 57. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Pure Oil Co., 120 So. 373, 374 (La. 1928). 
 58. Id at 374. 
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out state duties and should therefore be immune from 
prescription.59 The court rejected this argument and held that:  
[P]laintiff has, and always has had, the right to sue and to 
be sued in its corporate name. It is a separate entity from 
the state, created by the state, it is true, to accomplish 
certain public purposes, but is nevertheless distinct from it. 
. . . [W]e therefore rule that the prescription pleaded runs 
against plaintiff.60 
In 1959, the Louisiana Supreme Court extended this reasoning 
to school boards in Stokes v. Harrison.61 In Stokes, the Beauregard 
Parish School Board purchased a tract of non-Sixteenth Section 
land and subsequently sold it.62 Thirty-five years later, and after a 
handful of subsequent sales and purchases of the land, the final 
purchaser executed a mineral lease on the property.63 Shortly 
thereafter, the school board executed its own mineral lease on 
same the property.64 In the suit that followed, the school board 
claimed that the tract of land became state land after its purchase 
by the school board.65 Therefore, as state land, the state and the 
school board retained ownership of the mineral rights for the land 
based on the Louisiana Constitution’s prohibition against state 
alienation of minerals.66 The defendant argued he was owner of the 
land’s mineral rights by acquisitive prescription of thirty years.67  
The Supreme Court ruled against the school board on 
constitutional grounds.68 The court examined the applicable 
portion of Article IV of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 and 
found the text illustrative.69 In the sections of that article dealing 
with the inalienability of the state’s mineral rights, the court found 
that the word “state” appeared alone, where other sections referred 
to the “state or any political corporation thereof.”70 The 1922 
legislative act that provided for the creation of Louisiana’s school 
boards stated that “parish school boards are constituted bodies 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 809. 
 60. Id. at 377; see also Bd. of Comm’rs v. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, 113 So. 127, 
128 (La. 1927) (applying identical rule to New Orleans Port Commissioners 
Board). 
 61. Stokes v. Harrison, 115 So. 2d 373 (La. 1959). 
 62. Id. at 375. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. (referencing LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1921)). 
 67. Stokes, 115 So. 2d at 375. 
 68. Id. at 380. 
 69. See id. at 378. 
 70. See id. at 379. 
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corporate.”71 The court noted that “[n]owhere, however, do we find 
a parish school board called the ‘State.’”72 Therefore, the court 
held that a school board is an “agency of the state, a corporate 
body and political corporation, the recipient from the Legislature 
of certain delegated powers”, but not itself the state.73 
In 1978, the Louisiana Supreme Court refined this position in 
Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc.74 The Louisiana 
Constitution of 1974 altered the provision of the previous 
constitution on which the Stokes court relied.75 The new 
constitution’s provision dealing with the alienability of mineral 
rights stated that “mineral interests of the state, of a school board, 
or of a levee district shall not be lost by prescription.”76 Based on 
this new provision, the LeBlanc court acknowledged that the 1974 
Constitution expressly overruled the Stokes holding and affirmed a 
lower court, ruling that levee districts were to be considered the 
“state” under the new constitution.77 While this provision dealt 
only with mineral rights and not with prescription in general, it 
suggested that Louisiana’s legislature intended to include school 
boards, like levee districts, as the state with regards to 
prescription.78  
Despite the holding in LeBlanc, in 1981, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court returned to the subject in State ex rel. Department 
of Highways v. City of Pineville.79 In that case, the Department of 
Highways advanced the City of Pineville a substantial sum of 
money in order to relocate water lines for the expansion of a local 
highway.80 The city accepted the cash advances but failed to repay 
them.81 The suit occurred six years after the advances, and the trial 
court held the cash advance to be a loan, which has a prescriptive 
period of three years.82 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that, 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. at 376 (citing Act. 100, 1922 La. Acts 204). 
 72. Id. at 377. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 362 So. 2d 734 (La. 1978). 
 75. Id. at 734 n.1. 
 76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 734 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 336 So. 2d 248, 253 
(La. Ct. App. 1976) (“Accordingly, we hold that a levee district, which was 
created as an arm of the executive branch of government for the purpose of 
carrying out a governmental function, i.e., flood control, is the ‘state’ within the 
intent of Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of 1921.”)). 
 79. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d 49 (La. 
1981). 
 80. Id. at 50. 
 81. Id. at 50–51. 
 82. Id. at 51. 
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even though the Department of Highways was a portion of the 
executive branch of the Louisiana state government, it was not to 
be considered the “state” and was therefore not entitled to 
immunity from prescription.83 This holding seemingly returned to 
the reasoning of the Stokes court. The court held that, while a 
school board was a state agency and therefore an “instrument” of 
the state, it could still sue and be sued independently and therefore 
was subject to prescription.84 
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit adopted this reasoning regarding Sixteenth Section lands in 
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Mobil Oil Corp.85 In that case, 
the school board leased a certain tract of Sixteenth Section land in 
Terrebonne Parish to the Southern Natural Gas Company in 
1957.86 The lease specifically granted Southern the right to dredge 
canals and perform other actions conducive to mineral exploration 
on the property.87 Southern subsequently assigned the lease to 
Mobil Oil.88 Mobil then drilled and operated an oil well on the 
Sixteenth Section in question until 1959, when the well was 
capped and abandoned.89 Terrebonne Parish School Board 
eventually filed a petition in its own name.90 The Terrebonne 
Parish School Board sought damages under both tort and contract 
law against Mobil Oil for environmental damages to the leased 
Sixteenth Section due to erosion allegedly caused by Mobil’s 
drilling.91  
Mobil filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the 
affirmative defense of liberative prescription against the plaintiff’s 
delictual claims.92 In opposition to the motion, the school board 
argued that claims related to Sixteenth Section lands came under 
                                                                                                             
 83. See id. at 52. 
 84. Id. (“[T]he ‘State’ . . . does not include a state agency which is a body 
corporate with the power to sue and be sued and which, when vested with a cause 
of action, is the sole party capable of asserting it. Regardless of its status as an 
instrumentality of the state, such an agency remains a distinct legal entity subject 
to claims of prescription except where the law provides otherwise.”). 
 85. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
 86. Id. at 873. 
 87. Id. 
 88. The assignment in question is known as “farm-out agreement.” See id. at 
873 n.2 (noting that “[f]arm-out agreements are frequently utilized in the 
petroleum industry in instances where the owner of a mineral lease is unable or 
unwilling to drill a lease nearing expiration but is willing to assign an interest to 
one willing to assume the drilling obligations and save the lease from expiring”). 
 89. Mobil Oil, 310 F.3d at 873. 
 90. Id. at 876. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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the protection of the state’s constitutional immunity from 
prescription.93 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the statutes relating to 
school boards and Sixteenth Section land and concluded that the 
school board was a separate entity from the state.94 Therefore, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the school board, which entered into a 
mineral lease under its own name and of its own choosing, could 
not claim to be acting as the “state” and could not avail itself of the 
state’s constitutional immunity from prescription.95  
D. The Problem: Current Circuit Split 
As shown above, twentieth century jurisprudence addressing 
Louisiana’s Sixteenth Sections did not develop a clear image of a 
school board’s relationship with regards to prescription in cases 
involving those lands. In the last decade, two decisions by 
Louisiana courts of appeal have again raised the issue. While one 
court ruled that Sixteenth Section land should benefit from the 
state’s prescription immunity, another ruled that they should not.  
1. Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Southdown 
In a suit similar to its 1998 action in federal court against 
Mobil Oil, the Terrebonne Parish School Board filed suit against 
various oil companies in Terrebonne Parish School Board v. 
Southdown, Inc. in 1999,96 claiming the defendant companies 
caused erosion and diminishment to a Sixteenth Section composed 
largely of marshland that the school board had leased to 
Southdown.97 The school board sought full restoration of the 
property and monetary damages in tort and contract for what was 
specifically described as “severe ecological damage.”98 The 
defendants argued prescription had run on the claims, and the trial 
court agreed.99  
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 878–79. 
 95. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d at 881, 883. 
 96. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Southdown, Inc., 887 So. 2d 8 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 97. Id. at 9–10. 
 98. Id. at 10 (“The [Terrebonne Parish School Board] further claimed that this 
continuing failure [by defendants] to restore the [school board] property has 
caused and continues to cause severe ecological damage . . . by altering and/or 
destroying the natural hydrology of the [marsh] located in Section 16, in addition 
to causing loss of acreage due to continuing erosion.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 99. See id. at 11. 
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On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit considered the issue of 
whether the state’s constitutional immunity from prescription 
applied to the school board’s claims regarding Sixteenth 
Sections.100 Relying on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in 
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. City of Pineville, the 
school board argued that when the state owns property, 
prescription cannot run against it, even if a state agency 
administers that property.101 The defendants countered that the 
proposition advanced by the school board was merely dicta and 
was not an accurate representation of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s holding in City of Pineville, which was that a school board, 
having independent power to sue and be sued, could not be 
considered the “state.”102  
The First Circuit echoed the reasoning of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in City of Pineville and the Fifth Circuit in 
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Mobil Oil: a state agency filing 
suit on its own behalf and of its own volition did not qualify for the 
state’s constitutional immunity.103 Applying this reasoning, the 
First Circuit held in favor of the defendant oil companies and 
dismissed the school board’s claims.104 The court stated, “The 
State of Louisiana is not a plaintiff in the instant case, and the 
governing authority of the parish, Terrebonne Parish Consolidated 
Government, did not file suit on behalf of the State. Instead, the 
[school board] asserts that it is the owner of all of the [Terrebonne 
Parish School Board] property.”105 With this holding, the First 
Circuit extended the line of jurisprudence rejecting a state 
agency’s, in this case a school board’s, ability to invoke the state’s 
constitutional immunity from prescription to the present. 
2. Vermilion Parish School Board v. ConocoPhillips 
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit produced a 
contrary decision in 2012 in Vermilion Parish School Board v. 
ConocoPhillips.106 The case, as it appeared before the court of 
appeal, was a consolidation of three separate actions for the 
underpayment of royalties derived from Sixteenth Section mineral 
                                                                                                             
 100. See id.  
 101. Id. at 12. 
 102. Southdown, 887 So. 2d at 12. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 14. 
 105. Id. at 12. 
 106. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
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leases occurring in the 1990s.107 All defendants filed exceptions of 
prescription.108 The trial court ruled that the state was not a party to 
the mineral leases, that the school board is a separate body with the 
sole power to enter into the mineral lease and that the school board 
has the power to sue and be sued.109 Therefore, the court granted 
the exception of prescription for each defendant, finding that the 
three-year prescriptive period was applicable because only the state 
is granted constitutional immunity from suit.110  
On appeal, the school board argued that it entered into the 
leases on behalf of the state, as trustee for the state as true owner of 
the land and its mineral rights, and on behalf of the school 
children, the beneficiaries of the trust.111 Actions for the recovery 
of royalty payments were, therefore, subject to a three-year 
prescriptive period unless the payment was derived from “state-
owned properties.”112 Defendants cited City of Pineville and 
argued that the school board was given the exclusive right to lease 
Sixteenth Section lands.113 As the mineral lessor, the school board 
has the capacity to sue to enforce the contractual rights under the 
Sixteenth Section land leases, and the defendants argued that it 
could not assert the state's constitutional immunity.114 
In its analysis, the court confirmed that the title to Sixteenth 
Section lands lies with the state.115 Therefore, the state owned both 
the land and the mineral rights, and the school boards merely 
administered the lands in the state’s name.116 Thus, the school 
board was a state agency against which prescription could 
potentially run, but actions involving Sixteenth Section lands were 
an exception because the school board was merely acting as an 
agent for the state.117 The court distinguished the case from 
                                                                                                             
 107. See id. at 1236. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1237. 
 112. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1237. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1239. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1238. Although this Comment focuses on the decision in 
ConocoPhilips, at least one other Louisiana Court of Appeal has joined this 
reasoning. See State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. La. Dep’t of Natural 
Res., 99 So. 3d 1028, 1034 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that prescription does not 
run against the state in an action involving Sixteenth Sections), writ denied 107 
So. 3d 614 (La. 2013).  
 117. See ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1240 (“The law is clear that a state 
agency can sue and be sued as an independent entity. In that case, the benefit the 
State has of immunity from prescription is not applicable. However, Section 16 
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Southdown and stated that the Vermilion Parish School Board 
benefited from the state’s constitutional immunity because the 
Vermilion Parish School Board included the State as a nominal 
party in its suit whereas the Terrebonne Parish School Board had 
not.118 Therefore, Vermilion Parish School Board’s action for 
recovery of royalty payments was not susceptible to prescription. 
III. TOWARDS A SOLUTION 
When reading the decisions in Southdown and ConocoPhillips 
in conjunction with one another, problems become immediately 
apparent. The rationales of each case are in direct conflict with one 
another. Both cases involved Sixteenth Section land and 
prescription issues over mineral leases. The first obvious question 
is whether the land or the lease was the determinant factor for 
triggering prescription. Southdown holds that the parties to the 
lease are key in determining whether prescription began to run.119 
In Southdown, the Terrebonne Parish School Board was an agency 
acting on its own behalf in making the lease.120 As a result, 
prescription could accrue regardless of the ownership of the 
land.121 The court in ConocoPhillips, on the other hand, held the 
presence of Sixteenth Section land as the key issue.122 Regardless 
of the factual autonomy of the school board in its ability to enter 
into and litigate over mineral leases, the state remained the owner 
of the land; therefore, claims involving those lands were immune 
from prescription.123 
                                                                                                             
 
lands are a different matter. Section 16 lands are lands owned by the State but 
managed by the school boards for the benefit of public education.”).  
 118. See id. at 1241 (“[T]he [Vermilion Parish School Board] entered into 
mineral leases as an agent of the State. The [Vermilion Parish School Board] has 
sued on behalf of the State and makes no claims that it owns the Section 16 lands 
at issue. Section 16 lands and minerals are owned by the State. The State has a 
right to sue for underpayment of royalties on Section 16 lands in its own name. 
The immunity from prescription provision of La. Civ. Code art. 3494(5) clearly 
applies to “state-owned properties.” The [Vermilion Parish School Board’s] 
claims that Defendants have improperly calculated and underpaid royalties on the 
Section 16 lands mineral leases are not prescribed pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 
3494(5) and La. Const. Art. 12, § 13.”).  
 119. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Southdown, Inc., 887 So. 2d 8, 9 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 120. Id. at 12. 
 121. Id. 
 122. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1241. 
 123. Id.  
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Another problem is one of statutory construction. The court in 
ConocoPhillips cited the language of Louisiana Civil Code article 
3494 and noted that three-year liberative prescription did not run 
against state-owned properties.124 As a result, the school board 
sued for damages in tort rather than for payment of royalties in 
Southdown.125 The prescriptive period for tort claims is only one 
year and is governed by a different provision of the Civil Code: 
Article 3492.126 Article 3492 contains no language exempting 
actions involving state owned property.127 The absence of such 
language could imply that the Louisiana Legislature intended for 
claims involving Sixteenth Section lands to only benefit from 
immunity from prescription in suits involving underpayment of 
royalties and not in suits involving torts or contracts. It is difficult 
to imagine that such a result is what the legislature intended. The 
patchwork nature of both the statutory scheme regarding Sixteenth 
Section lands, as well as the divided jurisprudence, stems from a 
problem of classification of the relationship between the state and 
the land. 
A. Classification of the Sixteenth Sections 
The language used throughout the Acts of Congress that 
delegated Sixteenth Sections for public education purposes in all 
states was described as a reservation.128 As described above, 
Louisiana jurisprudence also adopted much of the language of a 
trust relationship in describing Sixteenth Section land.129 However, 
in other cases, the relationship has been described as a mandate.130 
At least one other case has described school boards as owners of 
the Sixteenth Sections themselves.131 Each of these classifications 
has a strong presence in both the civilian tradition and Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 124. Id. at 1237. 
 125. Southdown, 887 So. 2d at 8. 
 126. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2014). 
 127. See id. 
 128. 2 Stat. 391 (1806) (“And be it further enacted, that the President of the 
United States be, and he is hereby authorized, whenever he shall think it proper, to 
direct so much of the public lands lying in the western district of the territory of 
Orleans, as shall have been surveyed in conformity with the provisions of the act 
to which this act is a supplement, to be offered for sale. All such land shall, with 
the exception of the section “number sixteen,” which shall be reserved in each 
township for the support of schools within the same.”). 
 129. See supra Part II.C.  
 130. See Bd. of Dirs. of Public Sch. v. New Orleans Land Co., 70 So. 27, 56 
(La. 1915). 
 131. See State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. Plaquemines Parish 
Gov’t, 652 So. 2d 1, 5 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
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law, leaving open the possibility that one of these relationships 
may help to better define the relationship and alleviate the present 
confusion. In civil law systems, things are classified for systematic 
reasons to facilitate understanding and legal regulation.132 It is 
therefore worth stepping away from the current patchwork system 
of various revised statutes governing Sixteenth Sections in order to 
properly classify Sixteenth Section land in civilian terminology. 
1. Public Things and Private Things 
First, it is necessary to classify the Sixteenth Section land. 
Land, a physical object that can form part of an individual’s 
fortune, is clearly a thing according to the Civil Code.133 Things 
are divided into common, public, and private things.134 The 
Louisiana Civil Code defines public things as things owned by the 
state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public 
persons.135 Private things, by contrast, are owned by individuals or 
by the state and its subdivisions in their capacity as private 
persons.136 The distinction is important. If Sixteenth Sections are 
public things, they cannot be owned by school boards unless 
school boards are considered a subdivision of the state, as all 
public things are owned by the state or its subdivisions.137 
Professor Yiannopoulos states that public things may be further 
divided into two categories.138 The first category consists of things 
that are inalienable and necessarily owned by the state or its 
political subdivisions.139 The second category consists of things 
that, though alienable and thus susceptible of ownership by private 
persons, are applied to some public purpose and are held by the 
state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public 
                                                                                                             
 132. 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 18, in LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 
35 (4th ed. 2001). 
 133. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things: Louisiana and 
Comparative Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 761 (Louisiana historically defines a thing 
as anything “which forms the fortunes of individuals.”). The Louisiana Civil Code 
does not contain a definition of a “thing,” though Louisiana case law traditionally 
attributed Pothier’s definition to the Code. See, e.g., Lombard v. Sewerage & 
Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905, 914 (La. 1973) (noting that the Civil Code of 1870 
defined an estate as anything of which riches or fortune may consist) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 134. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 448 (2014). 
 135. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2014). 
 136. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 453 (2014). 
 137. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450. 
 138. 3 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 45, in LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (4th ed. 2001). 
 139. Id. 
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persons.140 Sixteenth Section lands would certainly appear to fall 
into the latter category. The central problem with classifying 
Sixteenth Sections as public things, however, is commerce. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that public things are removed 
from commerce.141 It is difficult to contemplate describing 
Sixteenth Section land, which can be sold, leased, and rented as 
“out of commerce.” It seems more appropriate then that Sixteenth 
Sections are private things subject to public use.142 The Civil Code 
states that private things may be made subject to public use by law 
or by dedication.143 In this case, the original Acts of Congress call 
for this reservation, but that call has never been expressly 
translated into Louisiana law.144 However, the same Acts of 
Congress qualify as a formal dedication under Louisiana law.145 It 
seems rational to classify Sixteenth Section lands as a private thing 
subject to public use. However, as a private thing, it is necessary to 
determine if the state or the school boards are the true owner of 
Sixteenth Sections.  
2. Ownership of Sixteenth Section Lands 
At least one Louisiana court has stated that school boards are 
the owners of Sixteenth Section lands.146 However, the vast 
majority of Louisiana jurisprudence has held this is not correct.147 
Congress reserved and dedicated the Sixteenth Section in each 
township for the support of public schools.148 All statutes dealing 
with Sixteenth Sections expressly explain that the state owns the 
                                                                                                             
 140. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 cmt. c. 
 141. See City of New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 60 So. 2d 695, 697 (La. 
1913). 
 142. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 455 (2014).  
 143. Id.  
 144. 2 Stat. 391 (1806). 
 145. See Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Ass’n, 851 So. 2d 1006, 1011 
(La. 2003) (“Our legislature has never enacted a comprehensive scheme governing 
dedication to public use. . . . In the absence of such a comprehensive scheme, our 
courts have recognized four modes of dedication to public use: (1) formal, (2) 
statutory, (3) implied, and (4) tacit.”).  
 146. State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 
652 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. Ct. App. 1994). (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court held that 
passage of the legislation creating the State Mineral Board did not divest parish 
school boards of their ownership and rights to lease sixteenth section lands and the 
State Mineral Board had no power to do so absent an express legislative statement, 
which was not made in the subject legislation.”). 
 147. See supra Part II. 
 148. See 2 Stat. 391 (1806); 2 Stat. 662 (1811). 
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land in its capacity to own private things, and the school boards 
administer the Sixteenth Sections.149  
The school boards did not acquire Sixteenth Sections in their 
own right; instead, they are merely custodians of the property.150 
The State of Louisiana owns Sixteenth Sections in its capacity as a 
private person, and those Sections are private things applied to 
some public purpose: public education. Therefore, the school 
boards are not the actual and true owners of Sixteenth Section 
lands since it is clear that the state holds title to the land. 
3. Co-Ownership 
One possible classification for Sixteenth Sections, considering 
the ambiguous treatment of their ownership, is that school boards 
and the state are co-owners of Sixteenth Section lands. The Civil 
Code states that two or more persons may each own an equal share 
of the same thing.151 This possibility is dubious at best. At no point 
has any Louisiana statute or any part of the jurisprudence described 
the relationship between school boards and the state as co-
ownership of the Sixteenth Sections. Additionally, there are several 
factual circumstances that would not suggest a co-ownership 
situation.  
While a school board as well as the state may use and dispose 
of Sixteenth Section lands, a school board does not, as required by 
the Civil Code’s articles governing co-ownership, need consent of 
the state to make substantial alterations or improvements to the 
land.152 Further, a school board, as a state agency, rather than a true 
co-owner, does not possess the right to demand a partition of 
Sixteenth Section provided by Article 807.153 Most importantly, 
co-ownership does little, if anything, to alleviate the issues posed 
by prescription. Co-ownership would mean that both the state and 
school board own the land indivisibly. There would remain two 
owners, one against whom prescription could run and one against 
whom prescription is constitutionally barred, thereby providing no 
relief to the present confusion. As such, it is best to look elsewhere 
to classify this relationship. 
                                                                                                             
 149. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013); supra note 26. 
 150. See supra Part II. 
 151. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 480 (2014). 
 152. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 804 (2014). 
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4. Mandate 
When the Louisiana Supreme Court has attempted to define the 
ownership of Sixteenth Sections, they articulated the relationship 
as a donation from the United States Congress with a mandate to 
manage the land for the benefit of public education.154 This 
definition provides another possible civilian legal institution for 
describing the Sixteenth Section relationship: mandate.155 A 
mandate is a “contract in which a person, called the principal, 
confers authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one 
or more affairs for the principal.”156 This contract may serve the 
interests of the mandatary, the principal, both, or a third person.157 
A mandate seems to fit the relationship between the state and the 
school boards. Louisiana acquired land from the United States 
Congress as a donation and acts as the principal. The school 
boards, therefore, function as a mandatary to administer Sixteenth 
Sections for the purpose of fostering public education for the 
benefit of the state’s school children. 
The main obstacle to classifying this relationship as a mandate, 
however, is the absence of an express contractual agreement. At its 
essence, a mandate is a contract.158 Some statutes governing the 
authority of school boards come close to accomplishing the job, 
but they ultimately fall short. For instance, one revised statute 
dictates a school board’s jurisdiction to include all property 
dedicated to education within a specific parish.159 While this 
statute and others already mentioned160 define many of the 
                                                                                                             
 154. See Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Ober, 32 La. Ann. 417, 419 (La. 1880) (“The title 
to this land has never been in the parish Board of School Directors. The title was 
in the State under the donation of the general government, and she held it for a 
specific purpose, with authority to sell the lands, and a mandate to hold the 
proceeds and invest them for the benefit of the schools.”). 
 155. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2989–3033 (2014). 
 156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989. 
 157. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2991. 
 158. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989. 
 159. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013) (“[A]ll lands, buildings and 
improvements, facilities, and other property having title vested in the public and 
subject to management, administration, and control by a parish school board for 
public education purposes but located within the geographic boundaries of a 
public school board created by the legislature after January 1, 1995, shall be 
managed, administered, and controlled by the public school board in whose 
geographic boundaries the lands, buildings and improvements, facilities, or other 
property is located, effective on the date such school board begins its initial year of 
actual operation providing for the education of students within its jurisdiction.”). 
 160. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:638 (2006) (“Whenever any real property 
has been acquired by the state of Louisiana, any municipality, parish school board, 
or any other subdivision or agency of the state of Louisiana by virtue of a deed, act 
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contours of a school board’s responsibilities regarding Sixteenth 
Sections, they can hardly be called a contract between the state and 
school boards. The Civil Code requires that each party to a contract 
consent to its formation.161 Consent to a contract requires an offer 
to be made by one party and then accepted by the other.162 A 
school board is an agency of the state created by the state through 
the state constitution.163 Their administration of Sixteenth Sections 
devolves on them through operation of law through a statute, rather 
than their consent to a contract.164 While school boards have 
capacity to contract, it cannot be said that the relationship between 
them and the state regarding Sixteenth Sections is a true mandate. 
5. Trust 
A third, and potentially more fruitful, mechanism to classify 
this particular relationship is through the institute of a trust. As 
noted earlier, the jurisprudence is heavy with references to 
Sixteenth Section lands being held in trust by the state and the 
school boards for the benefit of public education. A trust is a 
common law legal relationship where the trustee undertakes an 
obligation at the request of a settlor for the benefit of a beneficiary 
third party;165 despite the long history of trusts in the United 
States,166 they were long unknown in civil law.167 While always 
allowed in common law, separation of management and enjoyment 
                                                                                                             
 
of sale, donation, or other form of transfer, which contains a stipulation that such 
property is to be used for public school or public educational purposes, said deed, 
act of sale, donation, or other form of transfer, shall constitute a dedication of such 
property to the public for such purposes and the school board in whose district the 
property lies shall have the right to administer and use the property for public 
school purposes.”). 
 161. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1927 (2014). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9(A) (“The legislature shall create parish 
school boards and provide for the election of their members.”). 
 164. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013). 
 165. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (8th ed. 1999) (“The right, 
enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which 
another person holds the legal title; a property interest held by one person (the 
trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the 
beneficiary).”); see also GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS (5th ed. 1973). 
 166. See generally Carly Howard, Trust Funds in Common Law and Civil Law 
Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 343, 351 
(2006). 
 167. See Pierre Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts, 36 YALE L.J. 1126, 
1126 (1927). 
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of property is generally only allowed in civil law when a person 
lacks capacity to manage on their own.168 Regardless, many of the 
concepts embodied in the common law trust have traditionally 
been accomplished in civil law jurisdictions.169 Louisiana, as a 
mixed civil law jurisdiction and surrounded on all sides by 
common law states, chose to adopt its own trust code in 1964170 
rather than adopt traditional civilian approaches to the same 
relationship.171 The Louisiana Trust Code essentially adopts the 
common law institution of trust and attempts to structure it in a 
civilian framework. 
The current Louisiana Trust Code defines a trust as “the 
relationship resulting from the transfer of title to property to a 
person to be administered by him as a fiduciary for the benefit of 
another.”172 Any property susceptible of private ownership or any 
interest in such property may be transferred in a trust.173 The 
relationship between the state, school boards, and Sixteenth 
Sections seems well situated to be defined as a trust through the 
Trust Code. However, there are several statutory difficulties to 
defining the relationship through the Trust Code. First, the Code 
only contemplates that natural persons, financial institutions, or 
private non-profit corporations as these that can serve as trustees 
                                                                                                             
 168. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 48 (2014); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 221 
(2014). 
 169. See Lepaulle, supra note 168, at 1126; see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, 
Louisiana Trusts: The Experience of a Civil Law Jurisdiction with the Trust, 42 
LA. L. REV. 1721, 1730 (1982). The functions of a trust were accomplished by two 
Roman institutions, the fiducia and the fidei commissum. The fiducia was a two-
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the purpose is fulfilled, either to the original transferor or to a third party 
nominated by him. The beneficiary in the fiducia has no enforceable action at 
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in which property is given to a fiduciary, who is to later turn the property over to 
another, the fidei commissarius. This mechanism differs significantly from a trust 
in that the first grantee or beneficiary manages the property for his own interests 
and under no specific instructions from the transferor. The interests of the grantees 
are thus successive, rather than concurrent, as in a trust. Finally, the fidei 
commissum may only be created by testament. 
 170. See Lorio, supra note 170, at 1729–39 (discussing Louisiana’s trouble 
with adopting a trust code). 
 171. Id. 
 172. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1731 (2005). 
 173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1771 (2005). 
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and beneficiaries.174 Second, the Trust Code specifies that trusts be 
made by authentic act under private signature.175 
Clearly, the Louisiana Trust Code only contemplates written 
instruments between individuals and corporations, rather than an 
agreement between the state and the public. However, if the state 
and school boards are considered to be acting in their capacity as 
private persons, the trust relationship seems to properly account for 
all of the facets of the relationship. The state, as trustee, holds the 
Sixteenth Section land and all fruits and products thereof in trust 
for the beneficiary, which are the state’s citizens in this case. The 
trustee delegates the authority to administer the property to school 
boards. Conceivably, this classification would solve the issue of 
prescription as the state, in its capacity as trustee, holds title to the 
Sixteenth Section lands and school boards merely act on the state’s 
behalf. 
For the purposes of Sixteenth Sections, the beneficiary is not 
clearly stated. The benefit should devolve on public education. 
This would seem to suggest that the public is the beneficiary of this 
agreement. The Trust Code allows a trust to be created for a class 
of persons; however, it only contemplates a collection of an 
individual’s descendants.176 Regardless, the trust relationship 
offers a much more workable classification than other civilian 
options available. 
To summarize, it is clear that Sixteenth Sections are private 
things subject to public use that are owned by the state and 
administered by school boards. Viewed as a trust relationship, the 
United States as settlor granted Sixteenth Section land to the state 
of Louisiana. The state holds these lands as trustee; when school 
boards engage in juridical acts involving Sixteenth Sections, they 
function as the state in its capacity as trustee.177 Therefore, actions 
involving Sixteenth Section lands should not be subject to 
prescription because the state, in its capacity as a private person, 
owns these lands that are merely administered by school boards. 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine and the Louisiana Constitution 
Another potential solution to the issue of prescription involves 
the interplay between Article IX of the Louisiana Constitution and 
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the one legal framework that allows the general public to function 
as a trust beneficiary: the public trust doctrine. The public trust 
doctrine provides that public trust lands, waters, and living 
resources in a state, are held by the state in trust for the benefit of 
all of the people. The public trust doctrine also establishes the right 
of the public to fully enjoy public trust lands, waters, and living 
resources for a wide variety of recognized public uses.178 As a 
common law doctrine, the public trust doctrine is not a codified 
body of law, but a loose conglomeration of maxims that allows 
common law judges to restrict improper uses of public lands.179 
Clearly, the public trust doctrine provides an ideological 
foundation for extending prescription immunity to Sixteenth 
Section lands. Additionally, the doctrine has previously been well-
received in other aspects of Louisiana policymaking. For example, 
some have advocated for an increased reliance on the public trust 
doctrine as a foundation for governmental defense of Louisiana’s 
coastal wetlands.180 Others, however, have pointed out that 
adoption of a loose common law doctrine is non-civilian and not 
consistent with Louisiana law.181 Louisiana, as a mixed jurisdiction 
state, already has many statutes addressing the same principles. 
Louisiana has never expressly adopted the public trust doctrine; 
however, it is embodied in parts of both the Louisiana Constitution 
and the Civil Code.182 
Article IX, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution states that 
“[t]he natural resources of the state, including air and water, and 
the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the 
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar 
as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of 
the people.”183 This article demonstrates a firm commitment by the 
Louisiana government to protect the natural resources of the state. 
Similarly, the Civil Code states that some things are owned by the 
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state for the benefit of public use.184 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
has also directly acknowledged that the public trust doctrine is 
implicitly embodied in Article IX of the Louisiana Constitution. In 
Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control 
Commission,185 the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether 
Article IX of the Constitution permitted the state’s Environmental 
Control Commission to grant permits for a hazardous waste 
disposal facility.186 The court held that Article IX’s rule was a 
“rule of reasonableness,” which “requires a balancing process in 
which environmental costs and benefits must be given full and 
careful consideration along with economic, social and other 
factors.”187 
Subsequently, in Avenal v. State, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
considered whether a project to introduce freshwater from the 
Mississippi River into saltwater marshes to combat coastal erosion 
was allowed under Article IX.188 The added freshwater made the 
particular marshes less adequate for oyster cultivation, and various 
oyster fisherman sued in a class action.189 The court held that the 
freshwater diversion plan was in line with the public trust doctrine 
and was constitutional despite the economic hardships imposed on 
fishermen.190 
Considering the public trust doctrine together with 
jurisprudence produces an additional judicial solution for the 
prescription problem with Sixteenth Sections. Just as the Louisiana 
Supreme Court defined coastal wetlands as a protected resource 
under Article IX in Save Ourselves, it is well within the power of 
the court to define Sixteenth Sections as a protected natural 
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resource as well. This reclassification would effectively resolve the 
prescription issue and render the ownership of Sixteenth Section 
land a moot point. Additionally, considering the original and 
enduring purpose of Sixteenth Section lands, it would be proper to 
hold actions involving Sixteenth Section lands immune from 
prescription despite the potential for economic hardships oil 
companies, just as the court did in Avenal.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to separate energy policy 
from the policy of natural resources.191 Whether it is oil, natural 
gas, wind, water, or nuclear power, each energy source has 
implications for public and natural resources. Louisiana has, for 
many years, occupied a critical place in the United States’ energy 
industry. Oil and gas drilling and mineral exploration are central 
components of Louisiana’s economy. As the nation’s energy 
consumption continues to expand, more natural resources will need 
to be expended to satisfy the demand. In the long term, lawmakers 
will be forced to make more value judgments about which 
resources will and will not be sacrificed to satisfy America’s 
energy demand. 
In the short term, the law controlling Louisiana’s Sixteenth 
Section land demands clarity. If Louisiana’s legislators can control 
the future, Louisiana’s judges can control the present. The 
solutions discussed are not the only solutions to the problems 
surrounding Sixteenth Section land. A comprehensive revision of 
the revised statutes governing public school lands could also be 
beneficial to Louisiana and would alleviate this problem and 
others. Even without such a revision, however, the current 
jurisprudence provides the Louisiana Supreme Court two avenues 
to mend the current circuit split and provide some future security 
to Louisiana public education. 
While not as visible as an endangered species or a vanishing 
wetland, the land set aside in Louisiana and other states for public 
education by the founding fathers is an immense natural resource, 
and it deserves protection, even if that protection requires 
inconvenience for the energy industry. Sixteenth Section lands 
were granted to the state solely to enhance the quality of education 
for the state’s youth. Only if these lands remain solely reserved for 
that purpose, will they function as Thomas Jefferson once hoped. 
The realization of those hopes is certainly worth forcing company 
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lessees into a greater burden of vigilance in legal actions. 
Regardless of whether the Louisiana Supreme Court adopts a trust 
classification or grants natural resource status to Sixteenth Section 
lands, it must overturn the line of cases ending in Southdown and 
hold actions involving Sixteenth Section lands immune from 
prescription. To do otherwise betrays the goals for which these 
lands were originally entrusted to the state. 
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